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I got some funny looks when reading this book.  I was on holiday at the time in the Greek 
islands, sitting by the Aegean, and should probably have been reading Joanna Trollope 
instead.  Surprisingly, though, and although by no means intellectually lightweight, 
‘Diagnostic Cultures’ made excellent holiday reading. 
The first chapter, entitled ‘the spread of diagnostic culture’, starts with the provocative 
statement that each year in Western countries, around a quarter of the population will suffer 
with a mental disorder. Should we interpret this as evidence for the progress of psychiatry in 
identifying and treating mental illnesses that have always existed? Alternatively, might it be 
the case that modern life somehow creates new conditions, or social pathologies? Brinkmann 
argues that a third, more fundamental explanation is needed: the development over recent 
years of what he calls ‘diagnostic cultures’.  Increasingly, psychiatric diagnoses have become 
the lens through which people in Western societies understand ourselves and our suffering. 
They have substantially displaced religious and moral conceptions, and have also come to 
play an important role in our bureaucracies and our broader social arrangements. Partly, 
Brinkmann argues, this has been driven from above by those with a vested interest in these 
explanations, for example psychiatrists and drug companies. However, he also contends that 
citizens themselves are increasingly pushing for ‘pathologisation from below’, seeking 
diagnostic explanations for the various problems that we encounter in our lives.   
The second chapter expands on this, documenting how our ideas about distress are 
changing.  The third explains how cultural psychology - psychological analysis informed by 
cultural studies and sociology - may be a useful tool in understanding why psychiatric 
explanations are in the ascendant.    
Brinkmann then explores the ‘semiotic mediation’ functions of diagnosis. Semiotics refers to 
the way we use signs and symbols to regulate aspects of our lives, for example explaining 
events, affirming ourselves, claiming or disclaiming responsibility.  By way of example, he 
details some of his research with ‘Adult ADHD’ (attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder) 
self-help groups, sharing his observations of how members draw on the idea of an 
underlying brain disorder, an ‘entity’ of ADHD - to understand and account for their 
emotions and actions.  For example, members in the groups he attended used the idea as an 
explanation (“I finally got an explanation of why I snap”), as a form of self-affirmation (one 
member had ‘ADHD’ tattooed on his chest and explained his extreme orderliness as “an 
attempt to avoid the chaos”) and as a way of disclaiming responsibility (“The worst thing my 
psychiatrist could say was that there was nothing wrong with me – in that case I was simply 
lazy”).   
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The fifth chapter, entitled ‘the ideal subject in a diagnostic culture’, explores the implications 
of living in such a culture for the age-old question, originally seen as a religious one, (see e.g. 
2 Peter 3, 11) ‘How then should we live?’  Brinkmann suggests that a clue to the answer may 
lie in the GlaxoSmithKline slogan ‘Do more, feel better, live longer’. This turns the question 
into a quantitative one, begging the issue of why it is always good to do more, for example, 
or who is the judge of what is ‘better’. He asks whether in transforming existential, moral and 
political concerns into individual, decontextualised psychiatric disorders, we risk not only 
losing sight of the larger historical and social forces that affect our lives, but also of vital 
resources that people have historically used to understand ourselves and to help each other.   
Chapter 6 outlines a philosophical analysis of suffering and of the current ‘epidemic of 
mental health problems’.  Brinkmann suggests that it is best understood as a result of the 
dual forces of, on the one hand, the ‘psychiatrisation’ of suffering, explained above, and on 
the other, changed diagnostic practices.  He argues that human suffering requires a much 
broader analysis than the currently popular lens of ‘health’, one that also encompasses 
political, moral and existential questions. 
The seventh chapter, ‘Towards a comprehensive understanding of mental disorder’ 
summarises the argument so far and asks the question, ‘What are disorders?’ It outlines the 
framework of cultural psychology, a discipline which examines how our personal and our 
cultural lives are woven together, drawing not only on psychology but also on history, 
sociology and cultural theory. The emphasis is on studying people rather than focusing 
narrowly on the mind or brain.  
The final chapter looks into the future, forecasting that things could go two ways. On the one 
hand we could see the ‘end of pathologisation’.  Alternatively, diagnostic cultures could 
expand still further, using brain scans and genetic tests to ‘diagnose’ even those people who 
are not currently experiencing problems, based on calculations of risk and genetic 
vulnerability.  Sadly, given the financial dependence of not only psychiatry and the powerful 
pharmaceutical companies but also (within our current system at least) millions of 
psychologists and therapists on the diagnostic approach, I personally think the second is 
more likely.  
I really enjoyed this book.  I loved the way it provides an overarching framework to help us 
understand not only the ongoing debates about diagnosis, but the various interests driving 
them and why conversations about this issue are often so heated.   Reading it on holiday in 
between checking my Twitter feed, it felt in some ways like a refuge from the strong feelings 
and widely differing views expressed there and elsewhere on this issue: a place where they 
could be reflected on, understood and put into context. 
I also loved the way it bridged disciplines, reminding me of some of the useful 
interdisciplinary conversations in my own institution, where psychology is in a joint 
department with sociology and politics.  Many psychologists and psychiatrists are relatively 
ignorant about other, hugely relevant disciplines such as philosophy, history and 
anthropology.  
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My one point of disagreement with Brinkmann would probably be the issue of schizophrenia.  
As the editor of the British Psychological Society’s ‘Understanding Psychosis and 
Schizophrenia’ (Cooke, 2016; 2017) I was surprised to read on page 109: 
’Some diagnostic categories may refer to genuine illnesses that are best understood 
as brain disorders… schizophrenia and bipolar disorder come to mind.’   
Brinkmann’s position here appears similar to that of Psychiatrist Allen Frances who is 
concerned that ‘overdiagnosis’ leads to confusion between ‘normal’ people who have been 
inappropriately labelled and the ‘genuinely mentally ill’ (see e.g. Frances and Cooke, 2015), 
therefore misdirecting resources. 
This is not the position of many scholars, predominantly but not exclusively in the UK, who 
have been working to develop and articulate a psychosocial alternative to psychiatric 
diagnosis which specifically includes those experiences traditionally thought of as ‘serious 
mental illness’ (see e.g. Bentall, 2013; Boyle, 2014; Cooke, 2014; 2016; Cooke & Kinderman, in 
press:  Johnstone, 2014; 2017; Johnstone, Longden & Dillon, 2012; Kinderman, 2014;  Pilgrim, 
2014).  Many of these authors were also contributors to the recent British Psychological 
Society report ‘Understanding Psychosis and Schizophrenia’ (Cooke, 2014) which has been 
widely discussed in the UK (e.g. Allen, 2014) and in the USA (Frances & Cooke, 2015; 
Lieberman, 2015; Luhrmann, 2015) and which concludes that ‘the problems we think of as 
‘psychosis’ – hearing voices, believing things that others find strange, or appearing out of 
touch with reality – can be understood in the same way as other psychological problems 
such as anxiety or shyness’.   Indeed the framework that Brinkmann outlines in his last 
chapter, which sees mental distress as a confluence of a number of interacting factors, 
including societal as well as individual variables and cultural as well as individual sense-
making, fits well with these recent accounts of psychosis developed in the UK. 
 (1238 words) 
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